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Jurisdiction of the Court 
Jurisdiction is before this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-2a-3. 
Statement of Issues 
Plaintiff failed to sue defendant, Bryant Ross, within the four year statute of 
limitations but did file an amended complaint, adding Bryant Ross as a defendant 
five weeks after the statute of limitations expired. Plaintiff claimed that there was an 
identity of interest between Mr. Ross and his father, who was named in the original 
complaint, because of a family relationship, and that the complaint should therefore 
relate back in time. Plaintiff also argued that because Mr. Ross allegedly would 
suffer no prejudice by being forced to defend against the action, the complaint 
should relate back in time. The court held that there was no identity of interest 
between Mr. Ross and his father, and that summary judgment was appropriate in the 
circumstances. Three issues are presented: 
(1) Did the trial court err in its decision that there was no identity of interest 
between Bryant Ross and his father? 
(2) Did the trial court err in determining that the amended complaint did not 
relate back in time to the filing of the initial complaint? 
(3) Did the court err in granting summary judgment to Bryant Ross? 
These are questions of law, and are reviewed de novo. Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 
P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
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Statement of the Case 
Procedural Background: This is an appeal from the trial court's decision to 
grant summary judgment in favor of Mr. Bryant Ross, defendant and appellee. 
Defendant Christopher Ross also filed a motion for summary judgment, which was 
granted. That decision is not subject to this appeal. 
Facts of the Case: The plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident on 
November 21, 1996. The police were called to the scene and a police report was 
prepared. The police report clearly identified the other driver as defendant, Bryant 
Ross. (Addendum A) Approximately four-and-a-half months after the accident on 
April 2, 1997, the plaintiff gave a recorded statement in which she acknowledged 
that the other car was driven by defendant, Bryant Ross. (Addendum B) On 
November 17, 2000, plaintiff filed a verified complaint to recover damages for 
personal injuries that she allegedly suffered in an auto accident. The complaint was 
filed only four days before the statute of limitations expired and in it she wrongfully 
identified Christopher Ross as the individual who was at fault for causing the 
collision. Christopher Ross was served with a Summons and Complaint on 
December 18, 2000, approximately four weeks after the statute of limitations had 
run. 
Six weeks after filing her initial complaint, and five weeks after the statute of 
limitations had run, Ms. Penrose amended her pleadings to name the appellee, 
Bryant Ross, as an additional defendant. The new complaint alleged that Bryant 
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that struck her car, and that Christopher Ross was liable because he was the owner 
ol tliu auto driven by my.ml rtoss The Defendants answered the amended 
complnint a i u i U ' l l i i i i \> • 11 i hiiim ny |i idc|iiH:nl' iLii l ly Iheredlltr. 
Ms. Penrose did not oppose the motion o, Christopher Ross, and it was 
granted as a matter of course. She disputed that Bryant was entitled to summary 
j u d g r " * .i._w. - - J 
defendantss1 -r n o court disagreed with Ms. Penr- - i 
ana , ^ ;. ~n~'~ —IA:~~ folding "•-•' under the factual 
cir~:~^,- •••-- •-"-• ..••• ,. umstopher 
Ross, the father, and Biyai i l Ross, the son. 
Summary of the Argument 
I ,>. Ui rU > "'SS 
becaus .ended complaint,»»...0.1 auJeu mm as .3 defends 
the statute o? mitations had expired ""'le amended complaint did not relate back 
. ai 1 >\ules of Civil Procedure, be ^ .i> ..o •<..• ltity 
ot inlerest between Bryant Ross and his father Christopher i\«j»b 
iimy i.it interest means identity of legal interest or a crmmon legal 
loiiiily relationship 1 iv I ,iiffn n'-nl li i- IMINI:>II iii M 
1
 Ms. Penrose also argued that her prior designation of a "John Doe" 
indant preserved her action against Bryant Ross. In fact this was her main 
f-ient below. She has not raised the issue here, however, and therefore has 
( l i t . 
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that the defendants had a common insurer and common legal counsel does not 
establish an identity of interest. Since neither party was answerable for the 
negligence of the other, the defendants had different legal interests and positions 
with respect to the litigation underlying this appeal. The trial court, therefore, 
decided correctly when it found that the parties did not have an identity of interest 
and that the amended complaint did not relate back. 
Argument 
Introduction 
Both the facts and legal issues underlying this case are simple and 
straightforward. Ms. Penrose failed to file a complaint against Bryant Ross within the 
period prescribed by law. Mr. Ross moved for summary judgment on that basis, and 
Ms. Penrose opposed, alleging that her amended complaint should be viewed as 
timely, because Bryant Ross and his father shared an identity of interest. 
The identity of interest argument made by Ms. Penrose both here and in the 
trial court below is based on two allegations: 
(1) An identity of interest exists between Bryant Ross and Christopher Ross 
because the factual circumstances show that Bryant Ross would suffer no prejudice 
by being forced to defend this action; and, 
(2) A father-son relationship is sufficient to establish an identity of interest, and 
therefore the amended complaint should relate back in time. 
The fundamental questions presented for this court's review concern the 
scope of the "relation back" doctrine set out in Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure, and, whether the doctrine may be used to justify adding Bryant Ross to 
the underlying litigation after the statute of limitation had run, merely because he has 
a familial relationship with Christopher Ross. Mr. Ross is confident that when the 
court carefully considers the circumstances of this case, and rigorously applies the 
controlling principles of law, it will come to the same conclusion reached by the trial 
court. Namely, Bryant Ross does not share an identity of interest with his father, and 
the amended complaint naming him as a defendant was untimely filed. Summary 
judgment, therefore, was appropriate. 
Point I 
IDENTITY OF INTEREST CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED MERELY BY 
SHOWING A LACK OF PREJUDICE 
In her opening brief Ms. Penrose repeatedly argues that her amended 
complaint should relate back, because Mr. Ross has failed to show that he would 
suffer any actual prejudice in defending the action.2 In contrast, she points out that 
if the court declines to implement that doctrine, she will be deprived of her right to 
pursue compensation for her injuries. On the surface, this claim to fairness has a 
certain appeal. However, it comes into direct conflict with other policy choices made 
by our legislature in setting time limits in which an action may be brought. These 
2
 Ms. Penrose claims that because Bryant and Christopher Ross shared 
legal counsel (after Bryant Ross was finally sued and after the statute of 
limitations had run) and were covered by the same insurance policy, the 
investigation conducted by counsel would be useful for both parties. This is not 
true here. Because Christopher was not operating the vehicle, his defense to the 
first complaint was that he was not the person who allegedly caused Ms. 
Penrose's injuries. 
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promote prompt investigation and adjudication of disputes, while penalizing those 
who are dilatory. See, Breiaaar Props.. L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons. Inc.. 449 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 2002). In fact, by their very nature, statutes of limitation must 
operate without regard to individual questions of prejudice. After all, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to explain how a complaint filed one day after the running of the 
statute causes prejudice to a defendant, while one filed a day before the statute runs 
is deemed acceptable. Nevertheless, the legislature has determined that the former 
is subject to dismissal, while the latter may go forward. Simply put, any test that 
focuses exclusively on actual prejudice would end up swallowing the rule and would 
emasculate limitations and the certainty they support. 
As with any case, proper analysis requires that the parties and the court first 
identify the governing rules of law. Accordingly, a brief review of the relevant case 
and statutory authority is the proper place to begin the consideration of the issues 
presented here. As is made clear from its text, Rule 15(c) - the source of the relation 
back doctrine - is designed to allow a party to assert additional causes of action 
against a named defendant, even though the time for making the new claims may 
have passed.3 The rule is not, however, intended to function in the same manner 
when it comes to adding new parties to pending litigation. This was made clear in 
the seminal case of Doxev-Lavton Co. v. Clark, et.al.. 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 
1976), in which the Utah Supreme Court held that, generally, the relation back 
3
 The new causes of action must also arise out of the same course of 
conduct detailed in the first pleadings. 
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provisions of Rule 15(c) do not apply to amendments that substitute or add new 
plaintiffs or new defendants to an action. In making this decision, the Court 
expressed a specific concern that if the rule was used to justify the easy addition of 
new parties, the very purpose of statutes of limitation would be defeated. 
Doxev. supra, did, however, carve out a narrow exception to this general rule. 
The Court stated that if the party to be added had an identity of interest with a party 
already before the court, the amendment would be considered timely. Id., at 906. 
In so holding, the court reasoned that this exception was not harmful because where 
there was a true identity, the new party would not suffer any prejudice. 
The Doxev exception has become the source of considerable controversy. 
Parties, such as the appellant here, have latched onto the court's language 
regarding the lack of prejudice, and sought to use it to justify the late joinder of new 
defendants in any number of circumstances. This formulation of Doxev's holding, 
however, turns the case on its head. A careful reading of the opinion shows that the 
presence of an "identity of interest" is the actual predicate for relation back, and that 
the reference to a "lack of prejudice" is made only to show that the exception will not 
lead to injustice. Ms. Penrose's construction of Doxev. which focuses on the 
presence or absence of prejudice, suffers from the basic logical error of false 
equivalency. While the existence of a predicate may create certain extrinsic 
conditions, the presence of those extrinsic conditions does not always mean that the 
predicate is present. Or, in terms directly applicable to the issues under 
consideration here, an "identity of interest" may ensure a lack of prejudice, but the 
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mere absence of prejudice does not necessarily indicate the existence of the identity 
of interest. Plaintiff's arguments that prejudice must always be shown to invoke the 
statute of limitations would effectively destroy all limitations of actions. Uncertainty 
would abound and legislative intent would be ignored. 
If a lack of prejudice is not equivalent to an "identity of interest", how, then, 
should the phrase be defined? This is the next step. 
Point II 
THE PHRASE "IDENTITY OF INTEREST" IS A TERM OF ART USED 
TO DESCRIBE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTIES THAT IS 
CHARACTERIZED BY A COMMON LEGAL INTEREST OR 
POSITION. CHRISTOPHER AND BRYANT ROSS DID NOT HAVE 
THE SAME POSITION 
As implied, above, the appellant appears to view the test set out in Doxev as 
an empty vessel, which may be filled by any relationship between new defendants 
and old, if the relationship involves the possibility of communication. In appellant's 
view an identity of interest is established upon a showing that it was likely that the 
old party would have told the party to be added that a lawsuit was pending. (Here 
appellant is focusing on the question of constructive notice, which is really a variation 
on the lack of prejudice argument detailed earlier. The role notice plays in the 
analysis of these issues will be addressed below.) Such a standard, unfortunately, 
suffers from a number of basic flaws. For instance, it ignores the plain language 
chosen by the Utah Supreme Court to describe the circumstances that allow relation 
back. It also fails to take into account how the standard has actually been applied in 
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the past quarter of a century. And, finally, the appellant's version of the identity of 
interest test is so expansive that it allows the exception to swallow the rule. 
a. Identity of Interest is a defined term, with a precise meaning which 
does not apply here: The most obvious problem with Ms. Penrose's understanding 
of the expression "identity of interest", is that it fails to recognize that the language 
used in Doxev has a precise meaning. The phrase "identity of interest" is, after all, 
one that is commonly used in a number of legal contexts, ranging from the 
certification of class action lawsuits to the implementation of the doctrine of res 
judicata. See, for example, Condor v. Hunt. 1 P.3d 558 (Utah App. 2000), re: claim 
preclusion; Nunnellv v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Oqden. 154 
P.2d 620 (Utah 1944) re: class action lawsuits; and James Constructors. Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp.. 888 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1994) re: surety and indemnity law. What 
is significant about these cases is that in every instance the phrase "identity of 
interest" is employed in the same way, i.e., to describe a relationship that is based 
on a common legal position or common interest in a case. 
Of course, this usage conforms with, and is most likely derived from, the 
dictionary meaning of "identity", which inevitably involves the concept of "sameness", 
See, Webster's Unabridged Dictionary. 2001, p. 950. According to the plain 
language of the exception, in order for parties to share an "identity of interest" they 
must share the "same" interest. 
Ms. Penrose's proffered interpretation of the identity test utterly disregards the 
plain language of the decision. But unless we are willing to believe that the Utah 
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Supreme Court chose its words carelessly, and in doing so jettisoned a well-
established meaning for a commonly used phrase, the "identity of interest" test, as 
set out in Doxev. must be interpreted as requiring an identity of legal interest or a 
common legal position vis a vi the case at issue. 
b. The restrictive interpretation is supported by case law and does not 
fit the facts of this case: The more restrictive view of the test, which was adopted 
by the trial court and is advocated here by Mr. Ross, also finds strong support in the 
cases that have applied the standard to particular fact patterns over the years. In 
Doxev. itself, the Court was faced with a dispute over a real estate contract, and 
determined that an amended pleading that added the heirs of the parties named in 
the original complaint, could relate back because there was an identity of interest 
between the heirs and the decedents, who had signed the contract. This, of course, 
is a classic example of a common position or interest in a case. The rights and 
responsibilities of the heirs were in fact derived from - and in no way differed from -
the rights of their ancestors. 
Similarly, in the recent case of Nunez v. Albo, et.al., 2002 Utah App. LEXIS 
69 (Utah App. 2002), this court was presented with a case in which the plaintiff had 
first sued a physician, and then sought to add his governmental employers, the 
University of Utah and its medical school, as new defendants. This court found as 
a matter of law that this type of relationship created an identity of interest, and that 
the amended complaint would therefore relate back in time. As with the connection 
between decedents and their heirs, an admitted employer-employee governmental 
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relationship (as it was there) presents a classic case of a common position or 
interest in the litigation, because every aspect of the employer's liability is based on 
what the employee has or has not done. And every defense asserted by the newly 
added defendant is identical to the defenses possessed by the doctor. 
In contrast to these cases are those which find that other relationships, no 
matter how close, do not satisfy the "identity" test. The most instructive of these is 
Russell v. The Standard Corporation. 898 P.2d263 (Utah 1995). There, the Plaintiff 
alleged a claim for libel against the Associated Press and the Salt Lake Tribune in 
her first complaint. After finding out that the article had originated with the Standard 
Examiner in Ogden, Ms. Russell sought to add it as an additional defendant. 
Although the statute of limitations had expired, Ms. Russell claimed that because the 
parties had an active contractual relationship there was an identity of interest 
between the various defendants. The Supreme Court rejected this contention out 
of hand. Significantly, the Court made no inquiry into whether actual notice of the 
claim was given, although it is clear that parties involved in an active business 
relationship have both opportunity and reason to communicate about a variety of 
issues presumably including the subject of Ms. Russell's suit. Instead, the court 
simply pointed out that not all relationships involved an identity of interest. 
For this reason, Ms. Penrose's argument that an identity of interest is present 
in every relationship, in which the opportunity or likelihood that communication about 
a pending suit could take place, is without support in the case law. Mere 
opportunity for or even communication is not enough. The parties must also share 
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the type of common legal bond or position described in Doxev. supra, and Nunez. 
supra. 
That is not true here. Christopher Ross and Bryant Ross are two separate 
people. They own separate assets and incur separate debts, etc. It would be 
absurd to suggest that they are legally common. Neither the original nor the 
amended complaint based Christopher's liability on Bryant's actions. Christopher 
and Bryant, therefore, did not share a common view or interest in the case; it was, 
in fact, quite the opposite. Christopher's defense to the original complaint was to 
point the finger at his son, while his defense to the amended complaint was to 
express indifference. In neither case was he to be bound by the actions of Bryant. 
The facts here do not resemble those of Doxev or Nunez, and the court should not 
find an identity of interest. 4 
c. The position advocated by the plaintiff has no principled boundaries: 
Briefly, it should also be noted that the notice theory advanced by Ms. Penrose 
contains no principled means of distinguishing between relationships that would 
support an identity of interest and those which would not. If notice is the key, then 
it could arise under a myriad of facts. For example, what would happen if a person 
loaned his auto to a neighbor, and the friend caused injuries to a third party, who 
4
 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals recently reached the same conclusion in 
Nusbaum v. Knobbe. 23 P.3d 302 (Ok.App. 2001). The court was presented with 
a claim that a family relationship, the use of a common attorney and a common 
insurer created an identity of interest. The court rejected the argument, 
reasoning that familial relationships did not necessarily give rise to common legal 
interests. 
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then brought suit against the auto's owner? Is close proximity in residence the type 
of relationship that would support an assumption that notice was given? What if the 
auto was given to a co-worker? Is this sufficient to support the assumption? What 
about the case of a son who has become estranged from his father? Does the blood 
tie, in and of itself, support an assumption of notice? The Oklahoma Court of 
Appeals has answered this in the negative in Nusbaum. infra. 
These hypothetical situations are offered to show that no "type" of relationship 
can ensure that notice of a suit would be provided to another potential defendant. 
In order to assure fairness a trial court would be required to engage in significant 
pretrial inquiry to determine if actual notice was given. In the alternative, it could 
simply assume that all relationships would imply that notice was given. (Since it 
seems clear that a party wrongfully accused or only partially liable might well contact 
other potential defendants to help share the blame or costs.) This, however, raises 
the very problems noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Doxev. A test that provides 
no reasonable boundaries threatens to undermine the statute of limitation. A better 
option is to adopt the test accepted by the trial court and advocated here. It is firmly 
based on the plain language the Court selected in announcing the exception, and 
it conforms with standard modes of interpretation. 
Point III 
THE SO-CALLED MISNOMER CASES SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED 
TO THE FACTS IN THIS CASE 
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In arguing that notice is sufficient to establish a legal identity, Ms. Penrose 
cites to Sulzen v. Williams. 977 P.2d 497 (Utah App. 1999) and Wilcox v. Geneva 
Rock Corp.. 911 P.2d. 367 (Utah 1996) as support for her position. While it is true 
that these cases do appear to adopt a looser standard, a careful review of the facts 
of those cases shows that they are completely inapposite to the issues presented 
here. 
Both Sulzen and Wilcox share a common fact pattern and fit within what are 
commonly known as misnomer cases. In both cases the proper defendant was 
identified in the body of the complaint, but was misnamed in the caption, and in both 
the intended party was actually served with a copy of the summons and complaint. 
Finally, in both cases the amendments that were sought by the plaintiffs, were 
sought in order to correct a technical defect in the pleadings. 
These misnomer cases are analytically different from cases in which a new 
party is going to be added. For example, in misnomer cases there is no need to 
inquire into whether the parties share a common interest, because there are not 
multiple parties to consider. Similarly, in both Sulzen and Wilcox the fact that the 
parties were actually served with process obviated any need to inquire into whether 
notice was actually given. Each party had actually received notice. In Otchvv. City 
of Elizabeth Board of Education. 737 A.2d 1151 (N.J.Super. 1999), the Superior 
Court of New Jersey characterized the difference between misnomer cases and 
those in which a new party was to be added, as a difference between a formal and 
a substantive change. Noting that formal changes cause less concern. 
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In this case, the addition of Bryant Ross was not a formal or stylistic change. 
It was not a mere correction of spelling or capacity, nor was it a mere substitution of 
a misnamed party. (After all, Ms. Penrose maintained her action against Christopher 
Ross.) The amended complaint named a separate individual, who had rights and 
obligations separate and distinct from the party previously named. The more relaxed 
standard that was enunciated in Sulzen and Wilcox, was predicated on the fact that 
the actual parties were the same in both actions and is simply not applicable to the 
facts presented here. 
Point IV 
ALLOWING MS. PENROSE'S COMPLAINT TO RELATE BACK 
WOULD UNDERMINE THE DUTY TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE 
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF A CASE BEFORE 
BRINGING SUIT. 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party and counsel 
are under a positive obligation to undertake adequate investigation to assure 
themselves of both the factual and legal basis for making their claims before filing 
a complaint. Here, this means that Ms. Penrose and her attorney were required to 
take such steps as were reasonably necessary to ascertain who was driving the auto 
that collided with her back in 1996. Fortunately, such information5 is a matter of 
public record, and, as argued by Mr. Ross in his memorandum in support of 
summary judgment, is easily obtained by requesting an accident report from the 
5
 This information by law would also have been exchanged at the accident 
scene pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-31. (Addendum D) 
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investigating agency. (Addendum C) Yet, in her opening brief, Ms. Penrose admits 
that she did not take that simple step. 
Allowing the complaint to relate back in this case would reverse all of the 
general requirements that attend the filing of a lawsuit. Ms. Penrose's failure to take 
the steps necessary to preserve her cause of action - even though she had four 
years to ascertain the proper parties - would be excused. While, on the other hand 
that failure would be used to justify the deprivation of the assurances that statutes 
of limitation bring. The Court should not sanction such a result, especially in cases 
such as this where the failure to name the proper party was the sole result of Ms. 
Penrose's own negligence. 
Point V 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION HAD AN ADEQUATE BASIS. IT 
SHOULD BE UPHELD ON APPEAL. 
Ms. Penrose also makes a brief stab at claiming that the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to make adequate findings of fact regarding the relation back 
doctrine. She does not, however, flesh out that argument in any meaningful way, so 
it is difficult to know how to respond to it. It should be noted however, that the 
fundamental facts that governed the resolution of this case were undisputed. Ms. 
Penrose did not name Bryant Ross in a timely manner. Ms. Penrose amended her 
complaint to name Bryant Ross after the statute of limitation had expired. Bryant 
Ross and Christopher Ross have a familial relationship, were eventually represented 
by the same counsel but are two distinct individuals with separate legal identities. 
-16-
Based on these facts, the court made a ruling that as a matter of law, the amended 
complaint did not relate back, and that it must be dismissed as untimely. This 
adequately explains the ruling, and does not represent an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Penrose's amended complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had 
expired. An identity of interest cannot be established merely by showing that one 
party is related to another or that they shared common legal representation. 
Because there was no identity of interest as a matter of law, the amended complaint 
was not timely, and the trial court properly dismissed Ms. Penrose's action. That 
dismissal should be upheld by this court. 
DATED this 2 % K day of _ 3 k k j , 2002. 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
RICHARD K. QLAUSER 
MICHAEL W.WRIGHT 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM B 
RECORDED CLAIMS STATEMENT 
Date and Time Sent: 1/12/01 4:17 PM 
Return to: Julio Sandoval 
Claim Number: 44 1015 121 
Unit Printer*: 55/D 
If questions, please call Beth Abernathy at (970) 395-5219 
Q: This is this is Felix(sp?) ah Jensen(sp?) interviewing your first name is Nana(sp?)? 
A: Right 
Q: Is that the right pronunciation? 
A: It's Nana. 
Q: Nana and the last name Penrose? 
A: Right. 
Q: And that's P-E-N-R-O-S-E? 
A: Right. 
Q: Today's the 2nd of April 1997 the time is about ah 11:00 A.M. And ah your present 
address please? 
A: It's 1632 Princeton Avenue, 
Q: And that's in Salt Lake City? 
A: Right. 
Q: And your zip code? 
A: 84105. 
Q: And this recorded statement is being given with your full knowledge and consent is that 
correct? 
A: Right. 
Q: Call your attention to on or about the 21st of November of 1996 at the 900 east and 
about 850 south in Salt Lake City, Utah at about 12:38 P.M. I have it yoy,, had an 
accident th&r&^with a Mr. Bryant Ross, is thatrcorrect? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Just tell me in your own words what happened as best as you recall. Where you were 
going what took place anything you can tell me. 
A: I was just driving urn south on that street and I was ah there's ah two tenss pach_way™-
Q: 'Kay you were going south on 9th East? 
A: Urn hum. 
Q: Okay. 
A: And I was in the lane next to the center. 
Q: Alright. 
A: And ah he came out of the parking lot of Smith's and he cut across the... 
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Q: Well what's the what's what side of the street would that be? 
A: The ah west side of the street. 
Q: Okay and you were going south the inside lane? 
A: Urn hum. And he cut across the area where the cars are parked and then another lane 
and he just rammed right into the center of my car to where the front front fender or 
somewhere I didn't see the car. 
Q: Okay. 
A: Knocked it into the next lane of oncoming traffic. 
Q: So he hit you in the ah the passenger side of your vehicle? 
A: Right. 
Q: Did you have anyone else in the car with you? 
A: No. 
Q: Okay now tell me about the injuries that you suffered in the accident as best as you 
know. 
A: Um well um I- I hurt my neck... 
Q: Okay. 
A: My ah back... 
Q: You have a cervical... 
A: And ah... 
Q: Spine sprain? 
A: Ah cervical is the middle or neck? 
Q: That's the neck. 
A: Neck yeah and I think in my middle back too. 
Q: Okay. 
A: And ah and I've had headaches from whatever since um they seem to increase about 
about maybe I don't know exactly how long ago maybe about a month or s- a month well 
six weeks ago. 
Q: Okay. 
A: I wake up in the morning almost every morning with a dull headache especially when if I 
slept on my side but sometimes and then if I slept on my back sometimes they diminish 
a little bit and ah... 
Q: Right. 
A: Been going to physical therapy for that and um especially on the left side because oh as 
much as I can figure is he hit the car in the right and it must've thrown me forward and to 
the right where it pulled those muscles that so um I broke my hand I've had the back 
problem and the neck... 
Statement of Nana Penrose 
Claim Number: 44 1015 121 
Page 3 
Q: Which which hand did you... 
A: Had broke my left hand. 
Q: Okay so the wrist or the hand itself? 
A: The hand two two bones one's a spiral fracture and the other was a regular fracture. 
Q: In the hand itself? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay. 
A: And ah... 
Q: Now who who is taking care of that... 
A: Dr. Larcom. 
Q: Larcom? 
A: Larcom L-A-R-C-O-M, Peter. 
Q: Larcom okay, 
A: And um and so I had a cast on that or yeah I guess they call it a cast... 
Q: Right right 
A: And ah it's been stiff you know every since it's been pains on and off in it but but the 
thing especially there's a couple of fingers that um tingle at the end and are numb at the 
very end so I'm gonna see him again and see what there is to do about that with that um 
trying to think what else. 
Q: You have not recovered yet a- as far as you're aware? 
A: No no. 
Q: Okay. 
A: I'm gonna um... 
Q: Did you also,.. 
A: See another doctor about the neck because headaches it was recommended to see a 
neurologist so... 
Q: Yeah that might be a good idea. Now ah have you lost any time from work because of 
this accident? 
A: No. 
Q: Okay. 
A: Because I'm not working. 
Q: You're not working okay. Ah let see the time of the accident was approximately I have it 
at 12:38 P.M. is that correct? 
A: I would guess about that time. 
Q: Okay. During the daylight hours then? 
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A: Yes. 
Q: Any difficulty with the weather conditions anything like that? 
A: N-... 
Q: Snow on the road anything? 
A; No. 
Q: What did the fellow tell you when why he turned into you like that? 
A: I didn't talk to him. 
Q: He didn't he didn't talk to you at all? 
A: No we were both his head he had a head injury. 
Q: Okay. 
A: I glanced over and saw blood on his head and they took me in an ambulance to the 
hospital. 
Q: Okay. Anything else you can tell me about the accident Ms. Penrose comes to your 
mind? You were not speeding in anyway going down 9th East? 
A: No I wasn't. 
Q: Okay. 
A: I was just traveling the regular speed. 
Q: Alright. 
A: I wasn't urn trying to think if there's anything else ah... 
Q: So improper look out on the other guys part is probably what caused the accident? 
A: Yeah I think that he was probably this is just my guess I don't... 
Q: Yeah. 
A: Know that he... 
Q: Yeah that's... 
A: The way he the way he was going it wa-1 just was wondering if he was accelerating 
across a couple lanes of traffic to try to get into a left turn lane but that's purely 
speculation... 
Q: Yeah. 
A: On my part i didn't... 
Q: Okay. 
A: Know. 
Q: Okay are the remarks that you have made in this statement ah your true version to the 
accident to the best of your knowledge? 
A: Is it a true version? 
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Q: Yeah right. 
A: Yeah it is. i just don't know you know I haven't thought about it so I don't know if there's 
any details that I've left... 
Q: Well... 
A: Right now or not. 
Q: I think we've covered it pretty well. Okay... 
A: Any other questions you wanna give me? 
Q: No I think that's about all I need to ask you and ah this recorded statement has been 
given with your knowledge and consent is that correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Thank you Ms. Penrose this completes the recorded interview. 
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ADDENDUM C 
RICHARD K. GLAUSER (4324) 
MICHAEL W. WRIGHT (6153 ) 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
Parkview Plaza 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
(801)466-4228 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NANA PENROSE, 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. ; 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, an individual and ] 
Does 1-5, inclusive, whose true names are] 
not known to Plaintiff. ) 
Defendants. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
} J. KENT HOLLAND 
) Civil No.: 000909391 
I Judge L.A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, J. Kent Holland, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am an attorney duly licenced to practice law in the State of Utah, and have 
been so for over twenty (20) years; 
2. During the past twenty (20) years, I have practiced extensively in the areas 
of personal injury litigation and insurance defense and I am familiar with the 
general practices and procedures utilized by legal counsel to obtain 
information relating necessary to prosecute and defend such actions; 
3. It is a standard practice in this area of law to obtain the official accident 
reports compiled by the investigating officer, which are available from either 
the State of Utah or from the municipality or locality in which the accident 
occurred; 
4. In order to obtain the official accident report a party, or a party's attorney, 
need only request one from either the State or from the locality in which the 
accident occurred, and need provide only his or her name and the date of 
the accident; 
5. It is not necessary to provide the names of all parties who were involved in 
the accident to obtain an official copy of the report. 
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this J f t day of May, 2001. 
•sti. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5 ^ * ~ day of May, 2001. 
Notary Public | 
ZENQKSA&TIAG0 * 
767 East Dsonbee Avanu© I 
SaKLake City, Utah 84106 . 
My Commission Explrce § 
^ ^ ^ ..„ January 30,2005 
L ^ T ^ l « » m^^SJPttfiSbmm ml 
:JMO?ARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, UT 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage 
pre-paid, this. 'y^O day of May#f, 2001, to: 
Scott N. Cunningham 
211 East 300 South, Suite 216 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM D 
41-6-31 MOTOR VEHICLES 
41-6-31. Accident involving injury, death, or property 
damage — Duties of operator, occupant, owner. 
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or 
death of any person or damage to any vehicle or other property, if the vehicle 
or other property is operated, occupied, or attended by any person or if the 
owner of the vehicle or property is present, shall: 
(a) give to the persons involved his name, address, and the registration 
number of the vehicle he is operating; 
(b) upon request and if available, exhibit his operator's license to: 
(i) any investigating peace officer present; 
(ii) the person struck; 
(iii) the operator, occupant of, or person attending the vehicle or 
other property damaged in the accident; and 
(iv) the owner of property damaged in the accident, if present; and 
(c) render to any person injured in the collision reasonable assistance, 
including the transporting, or the making of arrangements for the trans-
porting, of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or 
surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if the 
transporting is requested by the injured person. 
(2) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or 
death of any person or property damage to an apparent extent of $1,000 or 
more shall immediately and by the quickest means of communication available 
give notice of the accident to the nearest office of a law enforcement agency. 
(3) If the operator of a vehicle is physically incapable of giving an immediate 
notice of an accident as required in Subsections (1) and (2) and there is another 
occupant in the vehicle at the time of the accident capable of giving an 
immediate notice, the occupant shall give or cause to be given the notice 
required of the operator under this section. 
(4) If the operator is physically incapable of making a written report of an 
accident when required under Section 41-6-35 and he is not the owner of the 
vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident shall within 15 
days after becoming aware of the accident make the report required of the 
operator under this section. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 21; C. 1943, Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
57-7-98; L. 1983, ch. 183, § 32; 1987, ch. 138, ment, effective April 29, 1996, substituted 
§ 25; 1992, ch. 28, § 1; 1996, ch. 174, § 1. "$1,000" for "$750" in Subsection (2). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles certificate, 6 A.L.R.3d 506. 
and Highway Traffic § 349 et seq. Sufficiency of showing of driver's involve-
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of statute ment in motor vehicle accident to support pros-
making it a criminal offense for the operator of ecution for failure to stop, furnish identifica-
a motor vehicle not to carry or display his tion, or render aid, 82 A.L.R.4th 232. 
operator's license or the vehicle registration 
41-6-32. Collision with unattended vehicle or other prop-
erty — Duties of operator. 
The operator of a vehicle which collides with or is involved in an accident 
with any vehicle or other property which is unattended and which results in 
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